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NOTES
people. To say that the framers of the Fifteenth Amendment
intended to guarantee the right to vote only in final elections is
just as much a matter of conjecture as to say that they intended
to protect the right to vote in primary elections as well as final
elections. At the time that the Amendment was ratified the
only election by the people was the general election. As the
population grew and the number of officials to be chosen by the
voters increased, the election machinery changed by necessity to
consist of two steps, the first, a primary election in which the
minor candidates are eliminated, and the second a final elimina-
tion or election between the major candidates. In many states
nomination on the Democratic ticket means practically election.
In other states the same is true of nomination on the Republican
ticket. The framers of the Amendment used as broad and gen-
eral terms as were possible. It does not seem probable that it
was their intention that the right of a negro to participate in
the actual election of public officials should be restricted by the
unforeseen development in the later elective process.
Certiorari has been granted in this case by the Supreme
Court. In view of the foregoing consideration, it is by no
means certain that the decision will be affirmed.
JOSEPH FEIGENBAUM, '32.
Smyth v. Ames IN THE SUPREME COURT
The rugged and to a great extent the ruthless individualism of
this country received a decided shock by the opinion of the Su-
preme Court in Munn v. Ilinois,' upholding the right of the
state legislature to regulate the rates of a company whose busi-
ness was such as to be affected with a public interest. The legis-
lature of Illinois prescribed the maximum rates which certain
grain elevator companies could charge. In addition to the at-
tack on the validity of state regulation, the company attacked the
constitutionality of the rate, insisting, among other things, that
it was the duty of the Supreme Court to decide whether the pre-
scribed rates would amount to a taking of property without due
process of law. To this the court answered:
It is insisted, however, that the owner of property is en-
titled to a reasonable compensation for its use even though
it be clothed with a public interest, and that what is reason-
able is a judicial and not a legislative question.
As has already been shown, the practice has been other-
wise. In countries where the common law rule prevails, it
has been customary from time immemorial for the legisla-
1 (1876) 94 U. S. 113.
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ture to declare what shall be a reasonable compensation un-
der such circumstances, or, perhaps more properly speaking
to fix a maximum beyond which any charge would be unrea-
sonable.
We know that this is a power which may be abused, but
that is no argument against its existence. For protection
against abuses by the legislatures the people must resort to
the polls, not the courts.
But ten years after this decision, the Court in Stone v. Farm-
ers' Loan and Trust Co., by way of dictum, without questioning
the regulatory power of a state in such instances, cast some
doubt upon the statement as made in Munn v. Illinois. "It is not
to be inferred," said the Court, "that this power of limitation or
regulation is itself without limit. The power to regulate is not a
power to destroy, and limitation is not the equivalent of confisca-
tion. Under pretense of regulating fares and freight, the state
cannot require a railroad corporation to carry persons or prop-
erty without reward; neither can it do that which in law amounts
to a taking of private property for public use without just com-
pensation or without due process of law.' 2
In Dow v. Beidleman,3 the question was again raised as to
the constitutional limitation of the legislature's rate-making
powers, in a suit to test the validity of an Arkansas statute re-
ducing the passenger fares. After quoting the dictum of the
above case without comment, the Court went on to add, "The
Court has no means, if it would under any circumstances have
the power, of determining that the rate of three cents a mile
fixed by the legislature is unreasonable." Thus it would appear
as if the statement of the Stone case was to become rhetorical
exercise.
But the dictum was soon to become law and the law as originally
laid down was to become obsolete. The Legislature of Minne-
sota enacted a law establishing a railroad and warehouse com-
mission,4 whose purpose it was to fix just and reasonable rates.
The court of last resort in Minnesota construed the act as con-
ferring final authority upon the commission. But this the Su-
preme Court overruled, on the ground that since no provision
was made for judicial review, the act was in conflict with the
Constitution as depriving the railroad of due process of law and
of the equal protection of the laws. Said the Court:
The question of the reasonableness of a rate of charge
for the transportation by a railroad company, involving, as
2 Stone v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. (1886) 116 U. S. 307.
3 (1888) 125 U. S. 680.
4 State v. Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Ry. Co. (1888) 38 Minn. 281.
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it does the element of reasonableness, both as regards the
company and as regards the public, is eminently a question
for judicial investigation requiring due process of law
for its determination. If the company is deprived of the
power of charging reasonable rates for the use of its prop-
erty, and such a deprivation takes place in the absence of an
investigation by judicial machinery, it is deprived of the
lawful use of its property, and thus, in substance and ef-
fect, of the property itself, without due process of law, and
in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and in
so far as it is thus deprived, while other persons are permit-
ted to reasonable profits upon their invested capital, the
company is deprived of the equal protection of the laws.5
Thus the policy of judicial review was finally accepted; 6 it was
evident that the ultimate burden of valuation for rate making
was now to be borne by the Supreme Court. By the acceptance
of such a burden the Court bit into a morsel of judicial function,
which for the past thirty-five years, it has been unable to digest.
If the Court was now to determine whether utility rates were
to be confiscatory or not, it meant that it would have to establish
or accept some definite basis upon which such rates could be fix-
ed. Hints as to what such basis might be were to be found in
some of the earlier cases. In 1888, in Dow v. Beidleman,7 the
Court was asked to declare a rate of three cents per mile con-
fiscatory as being able to pay a return of only a little more than
one and one-half per cent of the original cost of the road, and a
little more than two per cent of its bonded debt. However, the
road had recently been reorganized, and at the trial, there was
no evidence as to the cost of the bonds, or as to the amount of
the capital stock as reorganized, or as to the sum paid for the
road on reorganization. The Court refused to declare the rate
unreasonable, on the ground that it had no evidence of the cost
of the road, rejecting the idea of determining the rate on the
basis of the then outstanding securities. Thus the value of the
property as represented by the sums actually invested by the re-
organized company is recognized as a possible basis for rate
making.
The problem of valuation arose again, six years later, in
5 Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway Co. v. Minnesota (1890) 134
U. S. 418.
6 Although some doubt was thrown upon the holding in the Minnesota case,
ibid., by the cases of Chicago and Grand Trunk Railway Co. v. Wellman
(1892) 143 U. S. 339, and Budd v. New York (1892) 143 U. S. 517, still
such doubt was removed in Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. (1894)
154 U. S. 362.
7 N. 3 above.
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Reagan v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co.8 The State of Texas
had through its commission established a rate which failed to
yield a return sufficient to pay the interest on the outstanding
stocks or bonds. But here there had been no issuance of water-
ed stock, no unwise expenditures, nor injudicious management.
Under such circumstances, the Court held that the utility was
entitled to at least a reasonable return on the capital invested.
But as the Court further pointed out, the amount invested
could not always be controlling, as for example, when there had
been an extravagant expenditure of money, when there had
been a waste in management of the road, or when there had been
a watering of the stock. In such instances the present value of
the road might be the determining factor in the fixing of the
rates. But as to how this present value could be obtained, no
mention is made. Two years later a similar situation arose in
the case of Covington and Lexington Turnpike v. Sanford,9
where the return permitted was not even sufficient to pay the
operating expenses. One of the contentions of the company was
that the rates were insufficient to pay more than a four per cent
return on the outstanding stock. Following the previous deci-
sions, the Court again refused to allow the amount of the out-
standing stock to be taken as the base for the fixing of a rate.
To do so would be to subvert the public rights to private
interests.
This briefly was the situation prior to the famous case of
Smyth v. Ames.10 In order fully to appreciate the decision, ac-
count must be taken of the then existing economic situation. The
country at the time the act was passed (1893) was in the midst
of an economic depression chiefly due to the collapse of inflated
values. Speculating had been on the rampage. Construction had
been carried on at high prices. Finance knew of little or no regula-
tion. By the time suit was filed in Smyth v. Ames prices had taken
a tremendous drop and at the time of suit had reached their low-
est point. It was only natural that the utilities should advocate a
return based on the outstanding securities, representing the in-
vestment in the road, since a return on such sum would help
make up the difference due to the drop of prices. On the other
hand, Mr. Bryan, championing the people's rights believed that
the rate should be as low as possible."1 He argued, "The pres-
ent value of the roads, as measured by the cost of reproduction,
is the basis on which profit should be computed. . . The or-
dinary business man cannot avail himself of watered stock or
fictitious capitalization, nor can he protect himself from falling
prices. He profits and loses with rises and falls." He pointed
8 N. 6 above. 10 (1898) 169 U. S. 466.
9 (1896) 164 U. S. 578. 11 Ibid. 489-490.
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out further that roads at the time could be duplicated at $20,000
per mile, whereas a return was sought on securities representing
from $26,000 to $102,786 per mile of construction. The opinion
represented neither the views of those favoring reproduction
cost or of those favoring original investment. It held that
neither one nor the other was inapplicable, but that to a certain
extent, both were pertinent. Value could not be determined
without a consideration of either. The following rule was laid
down by the Court. It has been quoted in practically all of the
subsequent decisions on the subject, and from it there has been
no deviation, but, strange to say, it has been of little practical
value in solving the problem:
We hold, however, that the basis of all calculations as to
the reasonableness of rates to be charged by a corporation
maintaining a highway under legislative sanction must be
the fair value of property being used by it for the con-
venience of the public. And in order to ascertain that
value, the original cost of production, the amount expended
in permanent improvements, the amount and the market
value of its stocks and bonds, the present as compared with
the original cost of production, the probable earning capac-
ity under particular rates prescribed by statute, and the sum
required to meet operating expenses are all matters for con-
sideration and are to be given such weight as may be just
and right in each case. We do not say that there may not
be other matters to be regarded in estimating the value of
the property. What the company is entitled to ask is a fair
return on the value of that which it employs for the public
commerce. On the other hand, what the public is entitled
to demand is that no more be exacted from it for the use of
a public highway than the services rendered by it are rea-
sonably worth.
Reiterating the factors to be considered in determining the
rate base, it is seen that the first and second, namely, original
cost of construction, and the amount expended in personal im-
provements, represent the actual cost of the plant; the third, the
amount and market value of its bonds and stocks, is never con-
sidered except as it may show prudent investment; the fourth is
the cost of reproduction; the fifth, probable earning capacity of
the property under particular rates, and the sixth, operating ex-
penses, are not considered in fixing the rate base, though the fac-
tor of operating expenses becomes important once the rate base
has been settled; the seventh, possible other matters, covers a
multitude of things which the ingenuity of hundreds of highly
skilled attorneys, economists and engineers have been able to
think out, notably the so-called "intangibles." Says Professor
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Goddard, "How unthinking then, the habit of quoting this rule
when three of the seven matters are never considered in finding
a rate base, and the other four are considered in greatly modi-
fied form." 12
The rule now having been laid down by the Court, it is appro-
priate to study it in actual application. Following the principle
of the above case, the Court in San Diego Land and Town Co. v.
National City13 held that the actual value of the property at the
time the rates are fixed is to form the basis upon which rates are
to be computed. The evidence offered as to the original cost
was rejected since the costs of construction were extravagant,
and also because there were no reliable books on which to judge
the amount and extent of the outstanding securities. Such evi-
dence could not be held to be indicative of value at the present
time. If the company had made bad investments, the public
could not be made to pay for them. Properly then, the Court
rejected the contention of the utility.
San Diego Land and Town Company v. Jasper14 was a case of
a similar nature. The commission fixed the valuation at $350,-
000 on the basis of replacement cost. The company claimed a
valuation of $1,000,000 figured at original cost. But here, too,
the origirkal cost was based chiefly upon outstanding watered
stock, and again the Court refused to consider it in declaring
whether or not the rate was confiscatory. It added, however,
that although original cost might be considered, still in the pres-
ent case, it was of no importance.
Knoxville v. Knoxville15 introduced a new element into the
rule of Smyth ,v. Ames, namely, reproduction-new-less-deprecia-
tion. Said the Court: "The cost of reproduction is one way of
ascertaining the present value of a plant . . . but that test
would obviously lead to incorrect results if the cost of reproduc-
tion is not diminished by the depreciation which has come from
age and use." In Wilcox v. Consolidated Gas Co.,'0 the question
was whether the increased value of the property was to be con-
sidered in determining the rate base. The Court held that it
was, but qualified its statement to the extent that if the increase
in values becomes so great as to place an additional burden on
the public, then such increase was not to be allowed. However,
neither of the two cases purported to deviate from the Smyth v.
Ames decision.
The above cases did not question the propriety of the rule of
Smyth v. Ames, since from the time of the decision prices had
been on an upward trend. This meant that at some stage an
12 Goddard, Fair Value of Public Utilities (1924) 22 COL. L. REv. 652, 657.
13 (1898) 174 U. S. 739. 15 (1900) 212 U. S. 1.
14 (1903) 189 U. S. 439. 18 (1909) 212 U. S. 19.
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equilibrium would be reached at which point the rate base would
be the same for each party. However, when this equilibrium
point was reached and when prices went past that point so that
a return on reproduction now meant a greater return to the
utilities, the positions of the parties were reversed. Nor in sub-
sequent cases argued, did either litigant contend that it wished
to overthrow the principle of Smyth v. Ames, but rather both
professed to follow it, the only difference being in the belief as
to which elements were to be given more weight.
But even now, the Court refused to make reproduction new
the sole test in determining the rate base. In the Minnesota
Rate Cases17 the railroads attempted to include special values
for their real property, which had increased tremendously in
price. But such fictitious values were disallowed, the Court cit-
ing with approval Smyth v. Ames and stating that the ascertain-
ment of value is not to be controlled by artificial rules nor
formulas, but by a reasonable judgment having its basis in a
proper consideration of all relevant facts.
In 1915 in Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines,'8 the
Court again adhered to Smyth v. Ames, taking reproduction cost
less depreciation as a basis for determining the rate. However,
there was really no question as to the selection of reproduction
new or original investment as the dominant element in fixing the
rate, since it was determined on the basis most favorable to the
utility, namely reproduction new. The real issue was whether
going value was to be included in a determination of the rate
base, which element the Court said the commission would be
presumed to have considered.
The tremendous rise in prices during the World War, the un-
stable value of the dollar following at its close, the fear of a rapid
decline or further rise, made the finding of value a difficult prob-
lem. An attempt to solve this problem was made by fixing value
on the future plateau of prices, which method was sanctioned by
the Supreme Court in Galveston Electric Ry. v. City of Galves-
ton.19 In this instance the value was taken as the reproduction
cost on the historical bases, i. e., the estimated undepreciated
cost of reproduction at the time the plant was built, exclusive of
franchise value, going concern value, bond and brokerage fees,
but with land estimated at its present value. To this amount
the commission added 33 1/3% of that sum, which was to repre-
sent the increased price level and a prophesied future price level.
The company, however, wished to add 70% above the cost of
1913 as representative of the increase, but the request was
17 (1913) 230 U. S. 352.
Is (1915) 238 U. S. 153.
19 (1922) 258 U. S. 388.
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denied and the commission's finding upheld; and since the
original cost, the increased price level and the reproduction cost
had all been taken into account, the Court concluded that a fair
value had been found, or in other words, the elements of Smyth
v. Ames had all been considered and given effect.
Three interesting cases on the question of valuation were
decided by the Supreme Court in 1923, the first being that of
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commis-
sion.20 Here the commission compared the original cost of
three of the company's plants with the reproduction cost of the
same plants as based on the reports of the company's engineers.
Theratio between these two estimates was used in determining
the final value of the plant i.e., the final value bore the same ratio
to the company's estimate of the total reproduction cost, as did
the commission's value of the three plants compare to the com-
pany's value of the reproduction cost of the same plants. The
result was that the value found by the commission was $20,400,-
000, the company's cost being 72.4 per cent above such amount.
The Missouri Supreme Court2 ' upheld the finding of the commis-
sion as conforming with the rule of Smyth v. Ames, since the
commission had expressly declared that it had considered all of
the evidence, including original cost, cost of reproduction and all
other elements of value. The United States Supreme Court,
however, reversed the ruling, stating the valuation to have been
attained without any consideration of the reproduction cost ele-
ment. The Court said:
Obviously the commission undertook to value the prop-
erty without according any weight to the greatly enhanced
cost of material, labor, supplies, etc., over those prevailing
in 1912, 1914 and 1916. As a matter of common knowl-
edge, these increases were large. Competent witnesses es-
timated them as 45 to 50 per centum . . . We think the
proof shows that for purposes of the present case the valua-
tion should be at least $25,000,000.22
Thus it will be seen that neither original nor reproduction cost
was made the dominant or single element in determining value,
but that a medium was struck between the two opinions as to
what value should be.
However, from the opinion of the Court, although approving
the decision, Mr. Justice Brandeis, with whom Mr. Justice
Holmes concurred, dissented. In a remarkable opinion, the
learned Justice pointed out the defects in the rule of Smyth v.
20 (1923) 262 U. S. 276.
21 State v. Public Service Commission (Mo. 1921) 233 S. W. 425.
22 N. "20 above.
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Ames and in the reproduction cost theory, advocating instead, as
a method of determining the rate base, that of the prudent in-
vestment theory.
Bluefield Waterworks Co. v. Public Service Commission of
West Virginia23 presented a case similar to that of the South-
western case. Reproduction cost less depreciation was $900,000.
Original investment undepreciated was $500,000. The rate base
as fixed by the commission was $460,000. The rate fixed by the
commission on such amount was held confiscatory as no weight
was given to reproduction cost, consideration being given to only
one matter, namely original cost.
The third case, Georgia Railway v. Railroad Commission,24
presented a set of facts, so far as the rate base was concerned,
practically similar to the two above, and yet, in effect a different
result was reached. The commission determined the valuation
by ascertaining the original cost as determined by 1914 prices
and added thereto additions made at cost. The result was a val-
uation of $5,250,000. The company on the basis of reproduc-
tion new claimed a value of at least $9,500,000. However, the
commission allowed an additional amount of $125,000 to repre-
sent land appreciations. This finding the Supreme Court up-
held, Mr. Justice Brandeis writing the opinion, in which he said:
Here the Commission gave careful consideration to the
cost of reproduction; but it refused to adopt reproduction
cost as the measure of value . . . The lower court rec-
ognized that it must exercise an independent judgment in
passing upon the evidence; and it gave careful consideration
to replacement cost. But it likewise held that there was
no rule which required that in valuing the physical property
there must be "slavish adherence to the cost of reproduc-
tion, less depreciation" . . . The refusal of the Com-
mission and of the lower court to hold that, for rate-making
purposes, the physical properties of a utility must be
valued at the replacement cost less depreciation was clearly
correct.
Obviously one can see that the only difference between this
case and the Southwestern and Bluefield cases is that here $125,-
000 was permitted to represent a consideration of the cost of
reproduction. The practical effect was to permit original cost
to be the dominating element, since the amount allowed by the
commission was only 1/34 of that requested by the utility.
What is also striking is that in the Southwestern case the com-
mission testified that it had given weight to reproduction cost,
23 (1923) 262 U. S. 679.
21 (1923) 262 U. S. 625.
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although the Court held that it obviously did not. And yet, all
three of these cases professed to follow the rule of Smyth v.
Ames; none attempted to repudiate it.
The case in which reproduction new became almost synon-
ymous with value was that of McCardle v. Indianapolis Water
Co.25 In that case the original cost of the plant was fixed at$13,000,000. The commission fixed the value of the plant at$15,000,000, and the utility, on the basis of its engineer's re-
ports, contended for a valuation of $21,000,000. The lower
court enjoined a rate fixed on the $15,000,000 valuation and held
the present value to be not less than $19,000,000. To such a
holding the commission appealed, contending that the district
court had adopted as a measure of value the cost of reproduc-
tion new less depreciation estimated on the basis of spot prices
as of Jan. 1, 1924, or gave that figure controlling weight. The
company replied that the cost of reproduction less depreciation
estimated on the basis of spot prices was more than $22,500,000,
and that the court did not adopt such costs as a measure or give
them undue weight or influence. But the Supreme Court upheld
the decision of the lower court, stating,
While some expressions of the District Judge indicate that
he was of the opinion that dominant or controlling weight
should be given to cost of reproduction based on spot prices,
it is clear that the $19,000,000 fixed by him as the minimum
value could not have been arrived at on that figure.
To this decision Justice Brandeis dissented, stating, "The lower
court assumed that spot reproduction is the legal equivalent of
value . . . He believed that recent decisions of the Court re-
quired him to so hold. In this belief he was clearly in error."
Here again the Court followed the rule of Smyth v. Ames.
Comparing this case with the Georgia Railway case, it is difficult
to see why such different results should be reached. In one an
addition of $125,000 for increased value in lands was a sufficient
representation of reproduction new in determining the rate base,
whereas in the McCardle case, an addition of $2,000,000 over
original cost was not a sufficient representation, but an addition
of $6,000,000 was.
The Supreme Court having given such weight to reproduction
cost, the question arose, how would the Court react to the Inter-
state Commerce Commission methods of determining value.
Value up to this time had been ascertained by finding the unit
costs, plus costs of additions since the time of installation, plus
market value of lands. The Interstate Commerce Commission
was directed according to Sec. 15a (4) (6) of the Interstate
25 (1926) 272 U. S. 400.
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Commerce Act, amended by the Transportation Act of 192026 in
fixing a valuation on the railroads for the purposes of the recap-
ture clause, to take into account "all of the elements of value
recognized by the law of the land for rate-making purposes."
Would it be necessary for the Commission to include reproduc-
tion cost in determining value? The question was answered by
the case of St. Louis and O'Fallon Railway v. United States.27
The case arose as a result of the valuation placed upon the
railroad by the Interstate Commerce Commission in order to de-
termine those earnings which would be subject to the provisions
of the recapture clause. The Commission ascertained the value
of the road by taking the 1914 unit costs, to which were added
the actual cost of additions since 1914, plus the market value of
the lands. In making its report, the Commission stated that an
adherence to the reproduction cost doctrine was inapplicable and
unsound for railroad valuation. 28 The district court upheld the
finding of the Commission, but avoided any question as to the
valuation issue.29 The Supreme Court, however, declared that
because the Commission had given no weight to reproduction
cost, its findings were void.30 The Court stated that since for
the purpose of rate-making the Commission must take into ac-
count "the elements of value recognized by the law of the land,"
and since the elements as recognized by the law of the land in-
clude among them the cost of reproduction, the failure to take
such element into account renders both the valuation and the re-
capture order void. Once again the Court held that it was ap-
plying the law laid down by Smytk v. Ames. The practical ef-
fect of the O'Fallon decision was to nullify the recapture provi-
sion of the Transportation Act, as pointed out in the dissenting
opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis, with whom Mr. Justice Holmes
and Mr. Justice Stone concurred.
The result of the above survey of cases in the Supreme Court
shows that the rule as laid down in Smyth ,v. Ames thirty-four
years ago is still in effect. The most serious problem is as to the
advisability of further retaining it.
The first factor of significance is the ease with which the rule
can be applied to any set of circumstances. The elements to be
considered in their entirety are elements advocated by all of the
interested groups, and for the contingencies which might arise in
the future provision is made for other factors which might enter
into the rate base. At the time when the case was decided
21149 U. S. C. sec. 15 (a).
27 (1929) 279 U. S. 461.
28 In re Excess Income St. Louis and O'Fallon R. R. (1927) 124 I. C. C. 1.
29 (C. C. A. 2, 1927) 22 F. (2d) 930.
3o (1929) 279 U. S. 461.
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prices were at their lowest ebb. An acceptance of the original
cost theory would have shifted the burden created by speculative
organization and injudicious expenditures upon the public. The
adoption of a strict reproduction view would have been ruinous
to the railroads. Hence, a balance had to be struck. However,
it must be kept in mind that at this time there were no blue sky
commissions to regulate the issuance of securities, so that a de-
termination of original cost was practically impossible. Nor
could the books of the firm be referred to, since they were in
many instances both padded and false. To repeat, what in part,
has been stated before, after Smyth v. Ames prices started on an
upward trend so that litigation was not very extensive on the
subject, for prices were tending toward an equalization point.
At such point, the rates were agreeable to both parties. But
when the business cycle showed a tendency to continue upward
so that the equalization point would be passed, reproduction cost
became higher than original cost. An excellent example of this
is shown in the case of the Burlington Road, in which reproduc-
tion cost was $530,000,000, whereas original cost was $258,-
000,000. And it is remarkable to note that now the positions of
the parties began to change, the utilities advocating reproduction
cost, the people, original investment. The almost unescapable
conclusion is that the parties were not representing principles,
but rather, interests.
The unstable price period caused by the World War so dis-
sociated price from value that consideration had to be given to
increased prices. And even here, the Court held that it was ap-
plying the Smyth v. Ames rule. There is no need to reiterate
the results of the Supreme Court on valuation after the war ex-
cept to say that it again professed to follow Smyth v. Ames.
Thus it would seem, that it makes no difference as to the posi-
tions of the parties in regard to the existing economic conditions,
whether they were arguing reproduction new or original cost,
they could both assert with equal vigor that they were advocat-
ing or following the rule laid down in Smyth v. Ames. To state
it another way, Smyth v. Ames has set no standards or guides by
which the utilities or public may act. Each case amounts to
nothing more than a case of the first instance, the outcome of the
parties' actions being left to the determination of the courts.
But, it is argued, that it is because of this extreme flexibility
and because of this ready adaptability to changing circumstances
that the decision is a desirable one. The answer to such a con-
tention lies in an examination of the rule in actual application.
The whole is equal to the sum of its parts. Without attempt-
ing to enumerate specific instances of how imaginative values
have been placed into the rate base, or without pointing out the
differences in opinion as to what elements are to be considered
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in rate proceeding, a composite of the total results can best il-
lustrate the differences of opinion as to what constitutes value
for rate-making purposes. The table below represents the range
of values as found in attempting to estimate the fair value and
fair return for the New York Telephone Company: 31
Fair Value Rate pct. Fair Return
Majority of the Public Service Com-
mission ..................... $366,915,493 7 $25,635,000
Federal Court ................... 397,207,925 7 27,804,555
Minority of Public Service Com-
mission ..................... 405,502,993 8 32,480,000
Special Master's Report ........... 518,109,584 8 41,448,777
Company claim based on Whitte-
more appraisal .............. 528,753,738 8 42,300,249
Company claim based on Stone and
Webster ..................... 615,000,000 8 49,200,000
While undoubtedly the Commission gave practically all of its
weight to original cost, and the utility all of its consideration to
reproduction cost, yet both were following the requirements of
the Supreme Court decisions, the only differene being in the
weight afforded each item. But what is worth noticing is that
the Commission showed a difference in $38,587,500 as between
itself, whereas the utility offered two values showing a discrep-
ancy of $86,246,262.
The Georgia Railway case 32 affords another example. The
value of the plant was estimated by the commission at $5,250,000,
including reproduction cost (this resulting in an addition of only
$125,000), whereas the utility claimed a valuation of $9,500,000.
Here the Court allowed $125,000 as a sufficient representation of
reproduction, whereas in the subsequent McCardle case,3 3 the
Court added $4,000,000 to the commission's finding to make up
the reproduction element. Here too, both utility and commis-
sion were working in accordance with the Court's standards.
Then, too, the Court itself is in no better position to determine
reasonableness, for with but a vague standard by which to de-
termine its action it can do no more than to assert its view of
reasonableness based on the opinions placed before it. Thus
reasonableness finds itself at the apex of a pyramid built up en-
tirely on opinions.3 4
Nor can the social costs of these strained relations between
utility and public be neglected. As Mr. Justice Brandeis said in
31 New York Telephone Co. v. Prendergast (D. C. S. D. N. Y. 1929) 36 F.
(2d) 54.
32 N. 24 above.
Is N. 25 above.
. See Mr. Justice Brandeis's dissent in the Southwestern Bell case, n. 20
above.
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the Southwestern Bell case: "The most serious vice of the pres-
ent rule for fixing the rate base is not the existing uncertainty,
but that the method does not lead to certainty. Under it, value
for rate-making purposes must ever be an unstable factor. In-
stability is a standing menace of renewed controversy. The
direct expense to the utility of maintaining an army of experts
and of counsel is appalling. The indirect cost is far greater.
The attention of officials, high and low, is necessarily diverted
from the constructive tasks of efficient operation and of develop-
ment. The public relations of the utility to the community are
apt to become more and more strained. And a victory for the
utility, may in the end, prove more disastrous than defeat would
have been." 35
It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss the merits
of prudent investment or of reproduction cost, but whichever
view is adopted, or if rate-making is declared to be a legislative
function, or if the rate be determined on the basis of index num-
bers, it is clear that the rule of Smyth p. Ames is no longer ap-
plicable. Nor is this view shared alone by those advocating
original cost; those in the camp of reproduction new also favor
it. As says Professor Goddard, 30 a strong advocate of the
prudent investment theory, "It is time Smyth v. Ames went into
the discard. It served as a good temporary bridge. It is no
longer safe and nobody trusts his weight on it, though nearly all
claim to be trusting it to carry their weight across the stream."
And, as is said by Mr. Frederic G. Dorety,3 7 an advocate of re-
production cost, after pointing out Mr. Justice Brandeis's rea-
sons for reconsideration of the Smyth v. Ames doctrine, "The
necessity for the statement in some definite principle in valua-
tion has not been exaggerated by him."
TOBIAS LEWIN, '32.
THE APPLICATION OF THE FRONT FOOT RULE TO
PROPERTY OF IRREGULAR SHAPE
The apportionment of the cost of public improvement has, for
the most part, been accomplished by one of two methods. Either
the benefit accruing to each specific piece of property so affected
is determined and the assessment made upon that basis, or a
benefit district is designated and the assessments are levied uni-
formly against the property owners within that district. The
latter plan has been most widely used in distributing the expense
of paving or resurfacing city streets, the district being laid out
35 Ibid.
86 N. 12 above.
37 Dorety, The Function of Reproduction Cost in Public Utility Valuation
und Rate Making (1923) 37 HAn. L. REv. 173.
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